Auction design in the presence of collusion by Pavlov, Gregory
Theoretical Economics 3 (2008), 383–429 1555-7561/20080383
Auction design in the presence of collusion
Gregory Pavlov
Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the
players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their partici-
pation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal’s opportunities for extracting
payments from the agents in such a situation are limited, we show how the asym-
metry of information between the colluding agents can be used to reduce the rev-
enue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal
is even able to achieve the same revenue as when the agents do not collude. For
cases in which it is not possible to do so we provide an optimal mechanism in
the class of mechanisms with linear and symmetric menus and discuss the po-
tential beneﬁts of using asymmetric and nonlinear mechanisms. To address the
problem of multiplicity of equilibria we show how the optimal mechanisms can
be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms.
Keywords. Collusion, mechanism design, auctions.
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1. Introduction
In many environments a revenue-maximizing method of selling scarce goods is to or-
ganize an auction.1 However, since an auction exploits competition between the agents
to raise the revenue of the seller, it creates strong incentives for collusion between the
agents against the seller. In this paper we study a problem of optimal auction design in
the realistic case in which the players not only can collude on the way they play in the
auction, but also can coordinate their decisions regarding whether to participate in the
auction.
Previous studies of collusion in auctions focus on the optimal organization of a car-
tel in standard auctions. For example, Graham and Marshall (1987) study collusion in
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second-price auctions and McAfee and McMillan (1992) study collusion in ﬁrst-price
auctions. They show that in standard auctions the agents are able to collude efﬁciently
provided that they can exchange side payments. In such auctions with collusion a seller
never gets paid more than the reservation price. These studies also investigate some
simple responses of the seller to collusion, the most common of which is raising the
reservation price. This strategy, although helpful in reducing revenue loss, does not ren-
der collusion completely ineffective. Other suggested responses for the seller consist
of various ways of interfering with the cartel’s enforcement mechanism, which are not
always available to the seller.
The next logical step in exploring the question of the seller’s optimal response to
collusion is to go beyond the standard auction formats and to formulate the seller’s
problem as one of mechanism design. Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) pursue this
approach to study the principal’s response to collusion in problems of regulating ﬁrms
and providing a public good. A valuable insight of their work is to emphasize that the
agents may often fail to collude efﬁciently. In order to ensure the agents’ participation
in the cartel, the collusive agreement must provide the agents with higher payoffs than
they could obtain by refusing to participate in the cartel and playing in the principal’s
mechanism noncooperatively. These constraints, given that the agents have private in-
formation, may make it impossible for the cartel to operate efﬁciently. A principal’s op-
timal mechanism should thus take advantage of the presence of these constraints and
the resulting inefﬁciency of the collusive agreement to mitigate the effects of collusion
on revenue.
One intriguing result established by Laffont and Martimort (1997) is their proof of
the existence of an optimal mechanism that manages to eliminate all the effects of col-
lusion. Che and Kim (2006) signiﬁcantly generalize this result and provide a compelling
intuitionforit. Iftheagents’decisionsonwhethertoparticipateintheprincipal’smech-
anism precede the formation of the cartel, then the principal can “sell the allocation
problem to the cartel” at a constant price and attain the same expected payoff as in the
absence of collusion. The cartel becomes the residual claimant of the total surplus, and
the constraints the cartel is facing force it to implement the allocation desired by the
principal. Though the mechanism of Che and Kim (2006) is robust in a number of ways,
it relies on the timing of the agents’ decisions to participate in the principal’s mecha-
nism. Their mechanism fails to work if the agents have a chance to share their private
information before they decide whether to participate, because then they can “buy the
allocation problem” from the principal only in cases when it is worthwhile for the cartel.
In Section 2 we use an example to discuss the mechanism proposed by Che and Kim
(2006) and its reliance on the timing of participation decisions.
We study the problem of optimal auction design when the players can collude both
on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Notice that
the principal’s opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in this situation
are seriously limited. First, it is no longer possible for the principal to collect payments
from the agents but not allocate the good to any of them. In such a case the agents can
collectively decide against participating in the principal’s mechanism and thus avoidTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 385
any payments. Second, the cartel is able to coordinate the behavior of the agents in
the principal’s mechanism and thus to minimize the total expected payments for any
given allocation. Hence, it is impossible for the total expected payment the principal
receives for a given allocation in one case to differ from the total expected payment for
the same allocation in another case, because the cartel would always choose the lowest
total expected payment for a given allocation. This is in contrast to any standard auc-
tionwithoutcollusionwherethepriceatwhichagoodissolddependsonthesubmitted
bids. So in a sense the cartel behaves as a single agent. This reasoning is formalized in
Section 4.1, where for every given mechanism of the principal we derive a correspond-
ing menu of feasible allocations and the minimal costs for the cartel of achieving these
allocations.
However, a collusive mechanism must also provide the agents with payoffs that are
no lower than those they expect to get if they refuse to participate in the collusive mech-
anism and play the principal’s mechanism noncooperatively. This task of providing
these payoffs is not always simple given that the agents have private information. So
in this sense the cartel does not act as a single agent, but rather performs as a collective
decision-making institution that must be ratiﬁed by every type of every agent. Hence,
by choosing a mechanism the principal determines the outside options of the agents in
thecartelproblem,whichconstrainthesetoffeasiblecollusivemechanisms. Theorem1
describes a class of possible resulting allocations in the game between the principal and
the cartel. In Theorem 2 we show that for every allocation from this class there exists a
principal’s mechanism that ensures that this allocation is achieved.
Acarefullydesignedmechanismenablestheprincipaltolimitthescopeofcollusion
and reduce revenue losses. In Theorem 3 we show that in a class of environments the
principal is in fact able to eliminate all losses from collusion and achieve the same rev-
enue as in the case that the agents do not collude. An example of such a mechanism is
provided in Section 2. For cases when it is not possible to do so, Theorem 4 provides an
optimal mechanism in the class of mechanisms with linear and symmetric menus; the
potential beneﬁts of using asymmetric and nonlinear mechanisms are discussed with
help of examples.
Che and Kim (2007) independently study the same problem and obtain many of
the results of this paper. Our results on the optimal collusion-proof mechanisms ap-
ply to cases in which the principal has a single good for sale, the agents’ valuations for
the good are independently and identically distributed, and all agents participate in the
cartel. Che and Kim (2007) in addition present results on asymmetric agents and on
partial cartels. We consider both a case when the principal can prohibit reallocation of
the good between the colluding agents and when she cannot, while Che and Kim (2007)
consider only the latter case. Another point of difference is that in addition to solving
for the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanisms we also introduce a new notion of
uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms to address the important problem of the multi-
plicity of equilibria, and in Theorem 5 we show how the optimal mechanisms can be
implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. There are also methodological
differences between the two papers, which are discussed in Section 6.4.2
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A motivating example is considered
in Section 2. The model is presented in Section 3. The problem of the cartel is studied
in Section 4. In Section 5 we characterize the principal’s optimal mechanisms in the
presence of collusion. We discuss several extensions and the related literature in Sec-
tion 6, and conclude in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix unless stated
otherwise.
2. Example
Suppose a principal wants to auction a single good to two agents whose valuations are
independentlyuniformlydistributedon[0,1].3 Iftheagentsdonotcolludethenaccord-
ing to Myerson (1981) a mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue of the seller
has the following properties: (i) the good must be allocated to the agent with the high-
est valuation as long as it exceeds the cutoff of
1
2, and be withheld otherwise; (ii) the
expected payoff of the agent with the valuation 0 must be equal to zero. The expected
Myerson revenue is  =
5
12. Below we discuss three implementations of the optimal
mechanism, all of which perform equally well when there is no collusion, but which
yield drastically different expected revenues when the agents collude.
The ﬁrst mechanism is a second-price auction with the reservation price
1
2. This




the Myerson allocation, and the seller receives maxf
1
2,minf1,2gg if she makes a sale,
and 0 otherwise.
Graham and Marshall (1987) show that the second-price auction is susceptible to
collusion. They construct an incentive compatible “preauction knockout” collusive
mechanismunderwhichtheagentsbuythegoodfromtheselleratthereservationprice
1
2 and allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation if and only if the high-
est valuation exceeds the reservation price
1
2. This collusive mechanism results in the
Myerson allocation, but the principal’s expected revenue falls below the Myerson level.
She now receives only the reservation price
1
2 in case of a sale, while the remainder is
captured and redistributed between the colluding agents.
In the second mechanism each agent is charged a ﬁxed fee of
1
2, and then the
agents simultaneously decide whether to bid for the good or to stay out. If both agents
stay out then neither of them gets the good and there are no additional payments. If
agent i bids and the other agent stays out, then agent i gets the good and pays his bid to
his opponent. If both agents submit bids, then the highest bidder gets the good and the





8 if his valuation i exceeds
1
2, and stays out otherwise. This equilibrium
results in the Myerson allocation, and the principal receives only the sum of the ﬁxed
fees, which is equal to  regardless of the agents’ actions taken in the bidding game.
of collusion on participation decisions. We discuss the relation to these papers in Section 6.4.
3Throughout the paper we use feminine pronouns for the principal and masculine pronouns for the
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Che and Kim (2006) show that this mechanism renders collusion ineffective and
achieves the Myerson revenue if collusion takes place after the agents have agreed to
participateinthemechanism. Indeed,undersuchascenariocollusionoccurs“toolate”:
by agreeing to participate the agents have already committed to pay the ﬁxed fees that
provide the principal with the Myerson revenue regardless of the agents’ subsequent
actions. But the only way for the cartel to fulﬁll this commitment, while still inducing
the agents’ participation in the collusive scheme and without breaking the budget, is to
implement the Myerson allocation.
However, this mechanism fails to be collusion-proof if collusion takes place before
the agents have agreed to participate in the mechanism. If the agents share the infor-
mation about their valuations beforehand, then they can refuse to participate in the
mechanism if both valuations are smaller than the total ﬁxed fee . The principal’s ex-
pected revenue then falls below the Myerson level, because she receives the total ﬁxed
fee  only in case of a sale.
In the third mechanism the agents simultaneously decide whether to bid for the
good or to stay out. If agent i stays out, then he does not get the good and his payment
is zero. If agent i bids and the other agent stays out, then agent i gets the good and pays
the price
5
9 to the principal regardless of his bid. If both agents submit bids, then the
highest bidder gets the good and pays his bid to his opponent, while the loser pays
5
9 to







2, and stays out otherwise. This equilibrium results in the Myerson
allocation, and the principal receives
5
9 if she makes the sale, and 0 otherwise.
In this paper we show that the third mechanism renders collusion ineffective and
achieves the Myerson revenue even when collusion takes place before the agents have
agreed to participate in the mechanism. The Myerson allocation turns out to be cartel
interim efﬁcient when the cartel is facing such a mechanism: any alternative feasible al-
location necessarily makes some types of some agents worse off and thus is vetoed. For
example, consider a collusive mechanism that maximizes the sum of the agents’ ex ante
expected payoffs: the agents buy the good from the seller at the price
5
9 and allocate the
good to the agent with the highest valuation if and only if the highest valuation exceeds
the price
5
9. One can prove that such a collusive mechanism provides agents who have
sufﬁciently high valuations with expected payoffs lower than those they expect to get
through noncooperative play in the principal’s mechanism and thus is vetoed.
3. Model
There is one principal who owns a good, and n  2 agents. Each agent i has a valuation
i for the good, which is known only to him. Valuations are identically and indepen-
dently distributed according to a continuous cumulative distribution function F with
support [,], where 0   <  < 1, and an everywhere positive differentiable den-
sity f . This distribution is common knowledge. We require the distribution to satisfy a
standard condition on the hazard rates.388 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)














for every  2(,).
All players have quasi-linear utilities. Agent i’s utility is ipi   ti, where pi is his
probability of getting the good and ti is his payment. The principal’s utility is
Pn
i=1ti.
The principal offers a grand mechanism  , which consists of a set M = n
i=1Mi of
message proﬁles, an allocation rule e p : M !  = f 2 Rn
+ j
Pn
i=1i  1g, and a payment
rule e t : M ! Rn. For every i, Mi is the set of messages available to i. We assume that
each Mi contains a special message ? that indicates his rejection of the grand mecha-
nism. In case agent i sends the message ?, he does not receive the good and there is no
payment. An allocation rule e p associates with each message proﬁle a vector of proba-
bilities, e pi(m) being the probability that agent i is assigned the good when the message
proﬁleism. Apaymentrule e t associateswitheachmessageproﬁleavectorofpayments,
e ti(m) being the payment that agent i pays when the message proﬁle is m.4
An uninformed third party, a cartel, proposes a side mechanism S. From the revela-
tion principle there is no loss of generality in assuming thatS is a direct mechanism. So
the side mechanism consists of a set  = [,]n of proﬁles of type reports, a message
reporting function  :!M (where M is the space of probability distributions over
M), and a side payment function y :!Rn. A message reporting function  associates
with each proﬁle of reported types a probability distribution over message proﬁles re-
ported to the grand mechanism. A side payment function y associates with each proﬁle
of reported types a vector of side payments, yi() being the payment that agent i re-
ceives from the cartel when the type proﬁle is . The side payment function is assumed
to be ex post budget balanced:
Pn
i=1yi()0 for every  2. The side mechanism can-
not be observed by the principal, and the principal cannot verify what payments took
place between the agents.
Notice that in this formulation reallocations of the good between the agents are not
allowed. In Section 6.2 we show that most of the results of the paper remain true even
when the principal has no control over reallocations.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Timing of the game
1. The agents learn their valuations.
2. The principal offers a grand mechanism  .
3. The cartel proposes a side mechanismS.
4. The agents simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject the side mecha-
nism.
If all agents acceptS, then go to step 5. Otherwise go to step 50.
4The principal never beneﬁts from randomized payments because all the players’ payoffs are quasi-
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5. Each agent i reports a type b i to
the side mechanism.
6. A message proﬁle m is determined
according to (b ), where b  =
(b 1,..., b n), and is sent to the grand
mechanism.
7. Allocations e p(m), payments e t(m),
and side payments y(b ) are en-
forced.
50. Each agent i reports a message mi
to the grand mechanism.
60. Allocations e p(m) and payments
e t(m), where m = (m1,...,mn), are
enforced.
Notice that if the agents agree to collude, then they respond to the principal’s offer
after communicating with each other, because a message reporting function  can pre-
scribe sending a rejection message ? on behalf of each of the agents. This formulation
seems natural: agents can coordinate not only on the way they play the grand mecha-
nism, but also on their participation decisions.
Let us deﬁne a collusive allocation function p :  !  and a collusive payment func-
tion t :  ! Rn in order to describe what the cartel can do when facing a given grand
mechanism . Tostate theproblem ofthecartel formallyitis convenienttoseparate the
constraints describing feasibility and budget balancedness of the collusive allocation
and payment functions for a given grand mechanism from the rest of the constraints
the cartel is facing. For any given proﬁle  of the reported types, a randomization over
the message proﬁlesto be sent tothe grand mechanism is performedaccording to ().
Each message m results in a vector of allocations e p(m); the expectation over these al-
locations according to () gives p().5 Similarly, the expectation over vectors of pay-
ments e t(m) the agents pay, together with a vector of budget balanced side payments
y() the agents receive, determines t().
Definition 1. A pair of collusive allocation and payment functions (p,t):!Rn is
feasible and budget balanced in the grand mechanism   = hM, e p,e ti if there exists a side
mechanismS =h,,yi such that
(i) pi() = E()[e pi(m)] and ti() = E()[e ti(m)] yi() for every i and  2 , where
E()[] denotes the expectation according to () over M
(ii)
Pn
i=1yi()0 for every  2.
The remaining constraints of the cartel’s problem, as well as the objective of the car-
tel, can be stated directly in terms of the collusive allocation and payment functions
(p,t). Deﬁne the interim expected payoff of agent i of type i from participation in the
5In some environments free disposal of the good should be allowed. For example, free disposal seems
plausible for antiques auctions, but not plausible for procurement contracts auctions. It is straightforward
toincorporatefreedisposalinthemodelofcollusion, butitmakesthenotationmorecumbersomewithout
adding much value.390 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
side mechanism and following a truthful strategy by
Ui(i)= E i[ipi(i, i) ti(i, i)].
Thepairofcollusiveallocationandpaymentfunctions(p,t)mustbeincentivecom-
patible to ensure truthful type reporting by the agents.6 It must also be individually
rational: the interim expected payoffs from participation in the side mechanism have
to be at least as large as the interim expected payoffs from noncooperative play in the
grandmechanismfollowingtherejectionofthesidemechanism. Wedenotetheinterim
expected payoff of agent i of type i from nonparticipation by Vi(i), and call V1,...,Vn
the outside options in the cartel’s problem. Note that in an equilibrium where all agents
are supposed to accept the side mechanism a rejection by agent i may change the other
agents’ beliefs about the type of agent i, and, thus, the outside option of agent i may
depend on these revised beliefs.
The objective of the cartel is to maximize the weighted interim expected payoffs of
the agents. We allow for heterogenous welfare weights over agents and different types of
agents, which may reﬂect an asymmetric distribution of bargaining power in the cartel.
The welfare weights are described by non-negative, non-decreasing, right-continuous
functions !1,...,!n, where !i(i) is the fraction of agent i’s welfare weight concen-












with respect to !i.
The problem of the cartel facing the grand mechanism   = hM, e p,e ti with outside








Feasibility and Budget Balance: (p,t) is feasible and budget balanced in the
grand mechanism  
Incentive Compatibility: Ui(i)  E i[ipi(b i, i) ti(b i, i)] for every i
and i, b i 2[,]
Individual Rationality: Ui(i)Vi(i) for every i and i 2[,].
Notice that the individual rationality constraints require that every type of every agent
be willing to participate in the cartel in order for collusion to take place. We comment
on the generality of setting up the cartel’s problem in this way in Section 6.3.
6According to the revelation principle there is no loss of generality in focusing on the truth-telling equi-
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4. The cartel’s problem
4.1 Feasibility and budget balance
We introduce the concept of a menu to describe feasible and budget balanced collusive
outcomes for a given grand mechanism   = hM, e p,e ti. A menu describes the set of al-
locations the cartel can achieve, as well as the minimal cost of achieving any particular
allocation in the grand mechanism  . Deﬁne the set of allocations that the cartel can
achieve by sending various message proﬁles in the grand mechanism:
1 =fp 2jthere exists m 2M such that p = e p(m)g.
Deﬁne the function c1 : 1 ! R to be the lowest bound for the aggregate cost for the





e ti(m) for every p 21.
To avoid potential problems with the existence of a solution to the cartel’s problem we
impose the following assumption.















is equal to the limit.
Since the cartel can randomize over the message proﬁles it sends to the principal,
the set of feasible allocations may be larger than 1. Deﬁne  to be the convex hull
of 1:
 =co(1).
Deﬁne a function c :  ! R to be the greatest convex function that is pointwise weakly
lower than c1:7
c(p)=vex(c1(p)) for every p 2.
Asanillustration,letthegrandmechanismbetheﬁrst-orsecond-priceauctionwith
a common reservation price R  0. For given bids the allocation can be either null, or
a transfer of the good to a particular agent, or a fair lottery between two or more agents
in case of a tie. This is the set 1. The minimal cost for the cartel (c1) when the good
is transferred from the principal is R, and is 0 otherwise. The cartel can achieve any
allocation in by appropriaterandomization over submittedbids. Thusthe set is the
whole feasible set . It follows that c(p)=R
Pn
i=1pi. We return to this class of menus in
Section 5.
We say that a pair (,c) for a given grand mechanism   is the menu of the grand
mechanism  . The next result characterizes feasible and budget balanced collusive out-
comes in a given grand mechanism   using the concept of a menu.
7See for example Section 5 in Rockafellar (1970).392 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Lemma 1. Consideragrandmechanism withmenu(,c). Apairofcollusiveallocation
and payment functions (p,t):!Rn is feasible and budget balanced in   if and only
if
(i) p()2 for every  2
(ii) t() is such that
Pn
i=1ti()c(p()) for every  2.
This result provides a considerably more tractable characterization of feasible and
budget balanced collusive allocation and payment functions than the one given in Def-
inition 1. The set of achievable allocations and feasible payments in any grand mecha-
nism is succinctly described by the menu of this grand mechanism.
Noticethatthecartelcanalwaysachievethenullallocationandavoidanypayments
by sending the rejection message ? to the grand mechanism on behalf of every agent.
Hence, in any grand mechanism   the menu (,c) must satisfy 02 and c(0)0. This
important restriction on the menus of grand mechanisms can be viewed as due to the
possibility that the agents can collude on their participation decisions.
4.2 Simplifying the cartel’s problem
In this section we reformulate and simplify the cartel’s problem. So far we have stated
the problem of the cartel as a problem of the choice of collusive allocation and payment
functions (p,t) :  ! Rn. It turns out that now it is more convenient to think of the
cartel as choosing an allocation function p :! and interim payoffsU1,...,Un for the
agents, whereUi :[,]!R.
Proposition 1. The problem of the cartel facing a grand mechanism   with menu (,c)








F: p()2 for every  2
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The ﬁrst set of constraints, denoted by F, is just the set of feasibility constraints pro-
vided in part (i) of Lemma 1. The last set of constraints, denoted by IR, is the set of indi-
vidual rationality constraints that ensure participation in the collusive side mechanism.
In the three lemmas below we show that the set of incentive compatibility constraints
can be equivalently represented by condition IC, and the set of budget balance con-
straints, provided in part (ii) of Lemma 1, can be equivalently represented by the single
constraint BB.
Notice that the objective of the cartel, as well as the incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints, depend only on the interim expected payment
E i[ti(i, i)] for every i and i, rather than on the ex post payment ti() for every i
and . Hence, from the point of view of the cartel, any two pairs of collusive allocation
and payment functions are equivalent if their allocation functions and interim expected
payments coincide. This observation allows us to replace the ex post budget balance
constraints given in Lemma 1 with a single ex ante budget balance constraint. We say
that a pair of collusive allocation and payment functions (p,t) :  ! Rn in a grand







Lemma 2. Consider an ex ante budget balanced pair of collusive allocation and payment
functions (p,t):!Rn in a grand mechanism   with menu (,c). Then there exists
a budget balanced pair of collusive allocation and payment functions (p,t 0):!Rn
such that
E i[t 0
i(i, i)]= E i[ti(i, i)] for every i and i 2[,].
Next we simplify the set of incentive compatibility constraints. The argument is
standard (see for example Myerson 1981), and we state the result without proof.
Lemma 3. The cartel’s incentive compatibility constraints are equivalent to condition IC
in Program C* given in Proposition 1.
According to Lemma 3, for every agent i the allocation function pi determines the
individual payoff Ui and the expected payment up to a constant Ui(), which is the
payoff of the lowest type. Next we show that the sum of these constants is bounded
above by the budget balance condition.
Lemma 4. A pair of collusive allocation and payment functions (p,t) :  ! Rn in a
grand mechanism   with menu (,c) is ex ante budget balanced if and only if condition
BB in Program C* given in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed.
From Proposition 1 it is clear that the cartel will choose
Pn
i=1Ui() to be as high as





= E[c(p())]. This implies that the principal’s expected revenue
depends only on the allocation function p and is equal to E[c(p())].394 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
4.3 Characterizing the solution to the cartel’s problem
In this section we provide a partial characterization of the solution to the problem of
the cartel, which we later use to solve the problem of the principal. In particular we fo-
cus on the impact of the individual rationality constraints on the solution to the cartel’s
problem.
Consider an auxiliary problem of the cartel, where we drop the individual rationality
constraints (described by IR) and replace the cartel’s original welfare weight functions
!1,...,!n with new welfare weight functions W1,...,Wn. The apparent similarity of the
deﬁnition presented below to the concept of interim efﬁciency explains the name we
give to the solution of this auxiliary problem of the cartel.8
Definition 2. An allocation function and agents’ interim payoffs (p,U1,...,Un) are car-









F, IC, and BB in Program C given in Proposition 1.
Consider the problem of a cartel facing a grand mechanism   with menu (,c) and
outsideoptionsV1,...,Vn (ProgramC*). Incasethecartel’ssolution(p,U1,...,Un)issuch
that none of the individual rationality constraints bind, it is clear that (p,U1,...,Un)
must be cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the origi-
nal weights !1,...,!n. The next result shows that if some of the individual rational-
ity constraints bind, then (p,U1,...,Un) must be cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to
the menu (,c) relative to some weights W1,...,Wn, which may differ from the original
weights !1,...,!n.
Theorem 1. Assume (p,U1,...,Un) solves the problem of the cartel facing the grand
mechanism   with menu (,c) and outside options V1,...,Vn (Program C). Then there





for every i, such that (p,U1,...,Un) is cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to the menu
(,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn (i.e., solves Program CIE).
The intuition for this result is similar to the one present in the principal–agent prob-
lems when the agent has exogenous type-dependent outside options.9 One could guess
that due to the presence of the type-dependent individual rationality constraints the
8See Holmström and Myerson (1983).
9SeeforexampleJullien(2000). SeealsoCelik(2008)forasimilarcharacterizationofacollusiveproblem
in a different setup.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 395












Ui(i)di(i) subject to F, IC, and BB,
where the auxiliary weight functions 1,...,n are such that i(i) is the shadow value
of a uniform relaxation of the individual rationality constraints for agent i’s types that
are weakly lower than i. Thus the function i describes the pattern of binding indi-
vidual rationality constraints for agent i and is naturally interpreted as the cumulative
distribution function of the corresponding Lagrange multipliers in the cartel’s problem.
The proof conﬁrms that this intuition is almost correct. There exist weight functions
W1,...,Wn such that Wi(i) = r0!i(i)+ i(i) for every i and i, where r0 is equal to








Ui(i)dWi(i) subject to F, IC, and BB.
Moreover, it is possible to normalize Wi() = 1 and
R 
 dWi() = 1 for every i. For the
rest of the paper we restrict attention to weight functions W1,...,Wn normalized in this
way.
The beneﬁt of Theorem 1 is that it captures the effect of the individual rationality
constraintson thesolution tothecartel’s problem. Recallthat byofferinga grandmech-
anism the principal determines two things: the menu (,c) and the outside options
V1,...,Vn. ThelatterinturnimplicitlydeterminetheLagrangemultiplierscorresponding
to the individual rationality constraints, which force the cartel to maximize the agents’
weighted expected payoffs according to the new welfare weights W1,...,Wn. In the next
section we study how much power the principal in fact has in determining these new
welfare weights.
Ifwesubstitutetheexpressionsfortheagents’interimpayoffsU1,...,Un fromcondi-
tion IC in the problem describing the interim efﬁcient allocation functions and agents’
interim payoffs given in Program CIE then we obtain a deﬁnition of cartel interim efﬁ-
cient allocation functions.
Definition 3. Anallocationfunctionp iscartelinterimefﬁcientwithrespecttothemenu














F*: p()2 for every  2
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A cartel interim efﬁcient allocation function p with respect to the menu (,c) rel-
ative to the weights W1,...,Wn is essentially unique if any other cartel interim efﬁcient
allocation function p0 with respect to the same menu and relative to the same weights is




i(e i, i)]d e i =
Z i

E i[pi(e i, i)]d e i for every i and every i.
Itiseasytoshowthatif(p,U1,...,Un)iscartelinterimefﬁcientwithrespecttoagiven
menu relative to some particular weights, then p is cartel interim efﬁcient with respect
to the same menu relative to the same weights. This follows from integration by parts
and the fact that BB must hold with equality at the optimum. The following corollary
follows directly from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Assume(p,U1,...,Un)solvestheproblemofthecartelfacingagrandmech-
anism   with menu (,c) and outside options V1,...,Vn (Program C). Then there exist
weightfunctions W1,...,Wn suchthat p iscartelinterimefﬁcientwithrespecttothemenu
(,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn (i.e., solves Program CIE).
5. Solving the principal’s problem
5.1 Weakly collusion-proof mechanisms
In this section we characterize grand mechanisms that leave no scope for collusion.
When the cartel is facing such a mechanism, the best it can do is to replicate the allo-
cations and interim expected payoffs that the agents can achieve by refusing to partici-
pateinthecollusivemechanismandplayingnoncooperativelyinthegrandmechanism.
These collusion-proof mechanisms are of interest because it turns out that in our setup
there is no loss for the principal in optimizing over such mechanisms. The proof of this
collusion-proofness principle is the same as the one in Laffont and Martimort (1997),
and is therefore omitted.
The collusion-proof grand mechanisms introduced in this section are called weakly
collusion-proof because of the assumption that the players do not update their beliefs
following the rejection of the grand mechanism. In Section 6.3 we discuss uniquely
collusion-proof grand mechanisms, which are robust against collusion in a stronger
sense.
Fix a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a given grand mechanism   following the re-
jection of a collusive mechanism assuming that the agents do not learn anything from
the rejection of the side mechanism, and thus their beliefs about the types of the oppo-
nents coincide with their prior beliefs. The equilibrium strategies of the agents result in
a noncooperative allocation function pN :  !  and a noncooperative payment func-
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where E i[] denotes the expectation with respect to the prior distribution over  i.
We say that a grand mechanism   implements pN and (UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) if there exists an
equilibrium in a given grand mechanism   (played by the agents under prior beliefs)
resulting in an allocation function pN and interim payoffs (UN
1 ,...,UN
n ).
Definition 4. A grand mechanism   with menu (,c) that implements an allo-
cation function pN and interim payoffs (UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) is weakly collusion-proof if
(pN,UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) solves the cartel’s problem facing the grand mechanism   with menu
(,c) and outside options (UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) (i.e., solves Program C).
From Corollary 1, if an allocation function and interim expected payoffs
(p,U1,...,Un) solve the cartel’s problem facing a grand mechanism   with menu (,c)
and some outside options (Program C), then this allocation function p must be cartel
interimefﬁcientwithrespecttothemenu(,c)relativetosomeweightsW1,...,Wn (i.e.,
it must solve Program CIE). The next goal is to ﬁnd out which cartel interim efﬁcient
allocations the principal can achieve in a collusion-proof way.
Theorem 2. Assume  is a closed convex subset of  such that 02, and c :  ! R is
a convex function such that c(0)  0. Assume p is an essentially unique cartel interim
efﬁcient allocation with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn (i.e.,
solvesProgramCIE). Thenthereexistsaweaklycollusion-proofgrandmechanism with
menu (,c) that implements the allocation function p, irrespective of the cartel’s welfare
weights !1,...,!n.
Thegrandmechanism weconstructisadirectmechanism, whereinadditioneach
agent is allowed to send a rejection message ?, which triggers the null allocation and no
payments. The vector of allocations for any given proﬁle of reported types  is given
by p(). It is easy to construct incentive payments that assure truthful reporting by
the agents, because the allocation function p satisﬁes the monotonicity constraints IC.
Since p satisﬁes the constraint BB, it is possible to ensure that the interim payoffs of
every type of every agent are nonnegative, and thus nobody has an incentive to send the
rejectionmessage?. UsingLemma2wecanensurethatforanygivenproﬁleofreported
types  the sum of the collected payments is equal to c(p()), which together with the
condition F implies that the grand mechanism   has the menu (,c).
The intuition that this grand mechanism is weakly collusion-proof is as follows.
The cartel interim efﬁcient allocation p with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the
weights W1,...,Wn solves Program CIE, and thus maximizes the sum of the interim ex-
pected payoffs of the agents under the welfare weights W1,...,Wn. Any alternative al-
location that is not equivalent to p fails to be cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to
this menu and relative to these weights due to the essential uniqueness condition, and
thus results in lower interim expected payoffs for some types of some agents. Hence
any collusive proposal involving such an alternative allocation is vetoed by some types
of some agents because they obtain higher payoffs by playing in the grand mechanism
noncooperatively. This means that only collusive proposals involving allocations that
are equivalent to p are not vetoed. However, it can be shown that such proposals result398 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
in exactly the same interim payoffs as in the noncooperative equilibrium of the grand
mechanism speciﬁed above. Thus the cartel cannot do better than to simply replicate
the noncooperative equilibrium of the grand mechanism.
Let us explain the role of essential uniqueness in the result. Assume the welfare
weights W1,...,Wn do not have full support. Then there might exist another cartel
interim efﬁcient allocation p0 for which one can construct interim payoffs that are
weakly higher than the interim payoffs in the grand mechanism   and are strictly higher
for some types of some agents, which are outside the support of the welfare weights
W1,...,Wn. In this case the cartel may be better off proposing a side mechanism re-
sulting in an allocation p0, which renders   not collusion-proof. The requirement of
essential uniqueness precludes the existence of such an allocation p0.
Finally, let us note that the grand mechanism   constructed in the proof of The-
orem 2 is weakly collusion-proof regardless of the cartel’s welfare weight functions
!1,...,!n. This property of our weakly collusion-proof mechanisms is related to the
conceptofrobustcollusion-proofnessintroducedbyCheandKim(2006). However,weak
collusion-proofness is somewhat weaker because it assumes passive beliefs following
the rejection of the side mechanism, while robust collusion-proofness allows for a cer-
tain range of beliefs.
Corollary 1 to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 together provide a characterization of the
set of allocation functions that can be achieved by the principal in a weakly collusion-
proof way. According to Corollary 1, if we ﬁx a given menu, any such allocation must
belong to the set of cartel interim efﬁcient allocation functions. On the other hand,
by Theorem 2, if we ﬁx a given menu, any essentially unique cartel interim efﬁcient
allocation function can be achieved in a weakly collusion-proof way by the principal.
5.2 Achieving the second best revenue
In this section we describe the circumstances under which the principal incurs no rev-
enue loss from collusion. The second best mechanism when there is no collusion is
obtained by Myerson (1981). The allocation in the Myerson mechanism is given by
pi(1,...,n)=
(
1 if i >maxfmaxj6=i j,g
0 otherwise
for every i and (1,...,n),
where  is the cutoff type such that  =(1 F())=f () if such a value  exists, and










Theorem 3. The Myerson revenue can be achieved by a weakly collusion-proof mecha-
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The proof of sufﬁciency is constructive. Denote R = =(1 Fn()). Consider the
following linear and symmetric menu:
 = and c(p)=R
n X
i=1
pi for every p 2.
When the cartel is facing a grand mechanism with such a menu, it can buy the good at
the price R and allocate it to any agent. In case the cartel does not buy the good it can
avoid any payments to the principal.
Consider the following symmetric weight functions, which assign all the weight to
the highest type :
Wi(i)=W(i)=
(
0 if i 2[,)
1 if i =
for every i.
Consider the Program CIE describing the interim efﬁcient allocations under the
above weights and ignore the constraint BB for the moment. Notice that the virtual
utility of every agent i is equal to i +(F(i)=f (i)), which is strictly monotonic by Con-
dition 1. Thus for any given proﬁle of types the cartel prefers to buy the good and allo-
cate it to the agent with the highest type as long as this type exceeds a cutoff type b  such
that b  +(F(b )=f (b )) = R. By Condition 1, b    since  +(F()=f ())  R. The
expected revenue of the principal is thus equal to R(1 Fn(b )), which is greater than 
(unless b  = ). This is clearly impossible, and thus the constraint BB must bind and

























Incase+(F()=f ())<R theMyersonrevenuecannotbeachieved. Thecartel’s
optimal cutoff b  is now greater than , which can be shown not to violate BB. This
results in the expected revenue R(1   Fn(b )), which is smaller than . The proof of
necessity demonstrates that in this case no weakly collusion-proof grand mechanism
can achieve the Myerson revenue.
The condition for achieving the Myerson revenue present in the statement of The-
orem 3 is more likely to hold when the number of agents is small. This is due to the
fact that , and thus  +(F()=f ()), is independent of n, while the right-hand side
is increasing in n. Also notice that this condition fails if the Myerson mechanism in-
volves no exclusion:  =. In these cases the left-hand side is just equal to , while the
right-hand side is strictly greater than .400 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Example 1. Let n = 2 and let the types be distributed independently and uniformly





5.3 The optimal linear symmetric mechanism when the second best cannot be achieved
ThenextgoalistostudytheproblemoftheprincipalwhentheMyersonrevenuecannot
be achieved. This turns out to be a hard problem, so in this section we restrict attention
totheclassofgrandmechanismswithlinearandsymmetricmenus, whileinSection6.1
we evaluate the scope for grand mechanisms with nonlinear and asymmetric menus.
Definition 5. A grand mechanism   has a linear symmetric menu with a price R if
 = and c(p)=R
n X
i=1
pi for every p 2.
This class of mechanisms is of interest in its own right. In Section 4.1 we argue that
manystandardmechanisms, includingﬁrst-andsecond-priceauctionswithacommon
reservation price, have linear symmetric menus. Moreover, in Section 5.2 we have seen
that one particular member of this class of mechanisms successfully achieves the Myer-
son revenue.
Lemma 5. Assume the principal is restricted to offer grand mechanisms with linear sym-
metricmenuswithagivenprice R. Thehighestrevenueisachievedbyaweaklycollusion-
proof grand mechanism that implements a cartel interim efﬁcient allocation with respect
to this menu relative to the weight functions
Wi(i)=W(i)=
(
0 if i 2[,)
1 if i =
for every i.
The principal determines the virtual utilities i +((F(i) Wi(i))=f (i)) for Program
CIE describing the cartel interim efﬁcient allocations by choosing the weight functions
W1,...,Wn. The higher the virtual utility, the more often the cartel buys the good, and
thus the higher is the principal’s revenue. The highest possible virtual utility is achieved
by the weight function W and is equal to i +(F(i)=f (i)). Thus the preferences of the
principal are best aligned with the preferences of the agents with the highest valuations.
The complication comes from the need to satisfy the constraint BB. It may happen that
the most preferred allocation for a given virtual utility violates the constraint. The proof
showsthattheprincipaldoesbestbychoosingtheweightfunctionsW,...,W evenwhen
the cartel has to satisfy the constraint BB.
10The calculations are available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/
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Theorem 4. Assume  + (F()=f ()) < =(1   Fn()). Assume the principal is re-
stricted to offer grand mechanisms with linear symmetric menus. The highest revenue is



























dFn(e )Ô0 when  Ó0.
Due to the result established in Lemma 5, the problem of the optimal choice of the
price R is equivalent to the problem of a monopolist dealing with a single buyer whose
valuation is given by  +(F()=f ()) when his type is , and the types are distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function Fn. This buyer operates under an
additional constraint BB. In the Appendix we establish a technical result that this con-
straint binds only when the price R is greater than 0+(F(0)=f (0)), and in the proof of
the theorem we show that it is never proﬁtable to charge such a high price.
6. Extensions and discussion
6.1 On asymmetric and nonlinear mechanisms
In this section we show that when the Myerson revenue cannot be achieved, the princi-
pal may beneﬁt from grand mechanisms with asymmetric menus (Example 2) as well as
nonlinear menus (Example 3). We give only the main ideas here.11
Example 2. Let n = 2 and let the types be distributed independently and uniformly
on [10,11]. There exists a grand mechanism with an asymmetric menu that achieves
a higher revenue than the best grand mechanism with a linear and symmetric menu. 
The best grand mechanism with a linear and symmetric menu (Theorem 4) imple-
ments a cartel interim efﬁcient allocation relative to the weight functions W1 = W and
W2 = W with respect to the menu c(p1,p2) = Rp1 + Rp2, where R is approximately
10.194. The principal’s revenue is approximately 10.098.
Consider an alternative cartel interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to the asym-
metric menu c(p1,p2) = (R + ")p1 + Rp2, where R is the same as above and " = 0.05,
relative to the weight functions W1 =W and W2 = f W where
f W(2)=
(
0 if 2 2[10,10.75)
1 if 2 2[10.75,11].
11The calculations are available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/













Figure 1. The allocation in Example 2.
TheallocationisgiveninFigure1. Noagentgetsthegoodandthereisnopaymentto
the principal when the realization of the types (1,2) belongs to the subset denoted by
(0,0). Agent 1 gets the good and the principal receives R +" when (1,2) belongs to the
subset denoted by (1,0). Agent 2 gets the good and the principal receives R when (1,2)
belongs to the subset denoted by (0,1). This allocation is essentially unique and thus
by Theorem 2 there exists a grand mechanism that implements it in a weakly collusion-
proof way. The revenue is approximately 10.103, which is higher than the revenue from
the best grand mechanism with a linear symmetric menu.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If we just introduced the new weight func-
tions as above and left the menu unchanged (" = 0), the cartel would still buy the good
from the principal in the same states of the world as before, and only the allocation of
the good between the agents would change. The new weight functions result in a higher
virtual utility for the ﬁrst agent, and thus he now gets the good more often. This alloca-
tion is denoted by the dashed lines in Figure 1.
Now consider increasing the price of the good for the ﬁrst agent. Since the price
R is optimal in the symmetric mechanism, it optimally trades off the considerations
of obtaining higher revenue from the inframarginal types and losing revenue from the
marginal types. The mass of the inframarginal types of the ﬁrst agent under the new
allocation is higher. Thus it pays the principal to charge the ﬁrst agent a higher price.
The ﬁnal allocation is denoted by the solid lines in Figure 1.
Let us note that the constructed grand mechanism with an asymmetric linear menu
is not the optimal one. It just performs better than the best grand mechanism with a lin-
ear symmetric menu. Also we do not know whether the fully optimal grand mechanism
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Next we show how the principal may beneﬁt from offering grand mechanisms
with nonlinear menus. The example is similar in spirit to the one-principal and one-
agent model in Thanassoulis (2004), where the agent has multidimensional private
information.
Example 3. Let n = 2 and let the types be distributed independently and uniformly on
[10,11]. There exists a grand mechanism with a nonlinear menu that achieves a higher
revenue than the best grand mechanism with a linear and symmetric menu. 
Consider the grand mechanism with an asymmetric menu from Example 2. In ad-
dition, offer the cartel an option to buy a lottery at a price R under which the good





2) = R. The cost of any other allocation is determined by the lower enve-
lope (vex) over these four points.
The cartel interim efﬁcient allocation is given in Figure 2. No agent gets the good
and there is no payment to the principal when the realization of the types (1,2) be-
longs to the subset denoted by (0,0). Agent 1 gets the good and the principal receives
R +" when (1,2) belongs to the subset denoted by (1,0). Agent 2 gets the good and
the principal receives R when (1,2) belongs to the subset denoted by (0,1). The allo-
cation is determined by a fair lottery and the principal receives R when (1,2) belongs




2). This allocation is essentially unique and thus by The-
orem 2 there exists a grand mechanism that implements it in a weakly collusion-proof
way. The revenue is approximately 10.105, which is higher than the revenue from the
grand mechanism with a linear asymmetric menu in Example 2, and thus is also higher
than the revenue from the best grand mechanism with a linear symmetric menu. The
intuition behind the result is simple. The allocation prior to the introduction of the lot-




2) lottery at the price R
has two effects. In the instances when the virtual utilities of the agents are close to each
other, the cartel switches to purchasing the lottery since it is not that important who
gets the good. This results in a revenue loss for the principal. But there is also a positive
effect in that the cartel now buys in some states of the world where previously it did not.
In our example the second effect outweighs the ﬁrst. The ﬁnal allocation is denoted by
the solid lines in Figure 2.
6.2 Reallocations
Recall that throughout the paper we assume that reallocations of the good between the
agentsarenotallowed. Wenowdiscusswhathappenswhentheprincipalhasnocontrol
over reallocations.
In this case we must allow for reallocations of the good between the agents as part
of a side mechanism S. Deﬁne a reallocation function z : M   ! Rn which asso-
ciates with each message proﬁle reported to the grand mechanism and with each pro-
ﬁle of the reported types a vector of reallocation adjustments. The reallocation function














Figure 2. The allocation in Example 3.
Pn
i=1zi(m,)=0 for every m 2M and  2.12 At the ﬁnal node of the game (t =7) the
cartel performs the reallocation adjustments z(m, b ).
Definition 6. A pair of collusive allocation and payment functions (p,t):!Rn is
feasible and budget balanced in the grand mechanism   = hM, e p,e ti if there exists a side
mechanismS =h,,y,zi such that
(i) pi() = E()[e pi(m) + zi(m,)] and ti() = E()[e ti(m)]   yi() for every i and





i=1zi(m,)=0 for every m 2M and  2.
Foranygivengrandmechanism =hM, e p,e tiweconstructamenuthattakesintoac-
count the cartel’s possibilities for reallocations of the good. Deﬁne the set of allocations
that the cartel can achieve by sending various message proﬁles in the grand mechanism















Notice that r has the following form: r =fp 2j
Pn
i=1pi pg where p 2[0,1].
12It is straightforward to incorporate free disposal of the good in the model of collusion, but it would
make the notation more cumbersome without adding much value.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 405
Deﬁne the function cr
1 :r
1 !R to be the lowest bound for the aggregate cost for the
cartelatwhichanygivenallocationp canbeattainedbypurchasingitfromtheprincipal










e ti(m) for every p 2r
1.
Deﬁne the function cr : r ! R to be the greatest convex function that is pointwise
weakly lower than cr
1:
cr(p)=vex(cr
1(p)) for every p 2r.
Notice that for any p both cr
1(p) and cr(p) depend only on the sum of probabilities Pn
i=1pi. Also we must have cr(0)0 since the cartel can always achieve the null alloca-
tion and avoid any payments by sending the rejection message ? to the grand mecha-
nism on behalf of every agent.
Next we present an analog of Lemma 1 from Section 4.1 to obtain a tractable char-
acterization for the feasibility and budget balance constraints in this model.
Lemma 6. Consider a grand mechanism   with menu (r,cr). A pair of collusive alloca-
tion and payment functions (p,t):!Rn is feasible and budget balanced in   if and
only if
(i) p()2r for every  2
(ii) t() is such that
Pn
i=1ti()cr(p()) for every  2.
It is easy to see that under the reallocation scenario the results of Sections 4.2 and
4.3 hold if we replace the menu (,c) with the menu (r,cr). For Theorem 2 of Sec-
tion 5.1 to be valid we need to replace the ﬁrst sentence with: “Assume r = fp 2  j Pn






i.” Notice that linear symmetric menus satisfy
these conditions, and thus all the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 hold.13 In particular the
optimal linear symmetric mechanisms in Theorems 3 and 4 remain weakly collusion-
proof even if the cartel has the ability to reallocate the good between the agents. For the
samereasonTheorem5presentedinthenextsectionisalsovalidunderthereallocation
scenario.
The examples of mechanisms with asymmetric and nonlinear menus presented in
Section 6.1 do not satisfy the above restrictions on the menus, and thus are not weakly
collusion-proof under the reallocation scenario.
13We conjecture that under the reallocation scenario the optimal mechanisms always have linear sym-
metric menus.406 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
6.3 Multiple equilibria and uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms
One weakness of our optimal mechanisms is the focus on equilibria in which the agents
do not update their beliefs following the rejection of the collusive mechanism. Although
this approach is fully legitimate from the perspective of mechanism design theory, one
might argue that there may exist other, perhaps more plausible equilibria where the
agents learn something about their opponents upon observing the rejection of the pro-
posed collusive scheme.
Cramton and Palfrey (1995) propose the concept of ratiﬁable equilibrium in which
the agents update their beliefs following the rejection of the proposal in a plausible way.
Depending on the game, the outside options arising from ratiﬁable equilibria may be
higher or lower than the outside options generated by equilibria with passive updating,
andmaythusleadtothetighteningorrelaxationoftheindividualrationalityconstraints
in the cartel’s problem.
This approach can be applied when there is a single collusive proposal and a well-
deﬁned game to be played in case of rejection (and one can solve for asymmetric equi-
libria). However, in our setup the prospects of using this approach are quite grim since
the game to be played by the agents is itself a choice variable of the principal. Instead,
later in this section we use tools from implementation theory to address the issue of
multiple equilibria.
Another interesting approach is to consider an equilibrium where the beliefs used
by the rest of the agents about the type of the agent who rejects a collusive proposal
are chosen to maximize the interim payoffs of this agent, and thus lead to the maxi-
mal tightening of the individual rationality constraints in the cartel’s problem.14 Such
an equilibrium is likely to be the most preferred one by the principal, and, following a
standard approach in the mechanism design theory, the principal can choose this equi-
librium to be played following the rejection of the collusive proposal.15
We feel that such an approach stacks the deck in favor of the principal a little too
much. For example, consider the second-price auction with a reserve price that imple-
ments the optimal mechanism and achieves the Myerson revenue when the agents do
not collude. Suppose that after observing a rejection of the collusive proposal by one
of the agents the rest of the agents believe that the deviator’s type is above the reserve
price. Thenthereexistsanequilibriumwherethedeviatorsubmitsabidabovethehigh-
est possible type and the rest of the agents stay out, and thus the deviator receives the
good for sure at the reserve price. It is not difﬁcult to show that the problem of the car-
tel has no solution when the outside options are determined by the above equilibrium.
We are then forced to make a counterintuitive conclusion that the second-price auction
with a reserve price achieves the Myerson revenue because the collusion can be block-
aded by an appropriate choice of beliefs and equilibrium following the rejection of the
collusive proposal!16
14This approach is the polar opposite to the one pursued by Caillaud and Jéhiel (1998), who consider
a minmax equilibrium in which the beliefs are chosen to minimize the interim payoffs of the agent who
rejects the collusive proposal.
15We thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
16In this example agents use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium. It is possible to construct otherTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 407
There is another issue with the analysis performed so far. Notice that the individual
rationality constraints in the statement of the cartel’s problem require that every type
of every agent must be willing to participate in the cartel in order for collusion to take
place. Forexample,thisrequirementof“fullparticipation”rulesoutscenarioswherethe
cartel is formed only if all the agents have high types, and otherwise the agents play in
thegrandmechanismnoncooperatively.17 Tothebestofourknowledgethe“fullpartici-
pation”requirementispresentinallstudiesofcollusionunderasymmetricinformation,
and thus a discussion of the generality of this setup (or lack thereof) is in place.
For any given “incomplete participation” of this sort it is always possible to con-
struct a side mechanism that induces full participation of every type of every agent and
achievesthesameallocationandpaymentfunctionsasthoseresultingfromincomplete
collusion. Thiscanbedonebyconstructingamessagereportingfunctionthatreplicates
the noncooperative play in case the cartel is not formed, and using null side payments.
It is easy to see that the new collusive allocation and payment functions are incentive
compatible (by the incentive compatibility of the original equilibrium). So far the “full
participation” requirement proves to be without loss of generality. The problem may
arise when we turn attention to the individual rationality constraints. Indeed, Celik and
Peters (2008) present an intriguing example where the outside options in case of “in-
complete participation” differ from the outside options that can arise from any equilib-
rium satisfying the “full participation” requirement. Verifying whether the “full partici-
pation” requirement involves any loss of generality in our model does not seem feasible
because of the technical problems mentioned at the beginning of the section. Instead
we use a result from implementation theory to address all of the above issues.
Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) describe the allocation functions that can be uniquely
implemented in quasi-linear private value environments in a way that is robust to pre-
play communication and interim renegotiation. They show that the set of the allocation
functions that are implementable in this robust way coincides with the set of interim ef-
ﬁcientallocationsinagivenenvironment. First,anyinteriminefﬁcientallocationcanbe
improved upon by some alternative allocation function and is thus not implementable.
On the other hand, for any interim efﬁcient allocation one can construct a direct mech-
anism that has a truthful equilibrium resulting in this allocation. The difﬁcult part is
to ensure that there are no other equilibria resulting in some alternative allocation. No-
ticethat,sincetheoriginalallocationisinterimefﬁcient,anyalternativeallocationmust
necessarily make some types of some agents worse off relative to the original allocation.
Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) augment the direct mechanism by giving to each agent a
set of messages that trigger speciﬁcally designed individual allocations and payments
resulting in the same interim payoffs (minus " > 0 chosen by the agent) as the desired
allocation function. In this way all undesirable equilibria of the direct mechanism are
vetoed, and the standard techniques of implementation theory are used to make sure
that no other equilibria are created.
We use an adaptation of the Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) approach and introduce a
notion of uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms.
examples without this undesirable feature, but doing so requires a more elaborate argument.
17We thank one of the referees for pointing this out.408 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Definition 7. A grand mechanism   with menu (,c) that implements an alloca-
tion function pN and interim payoffs (UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) is uniquely collusion-proof if ev-




Notice that unique collusion-proofness imposes a requirement that must be satis-
ﬁed by every equilibrium of the game. These equilibria may entail either acceptance or
rejection of the side mechanism on the equilibrium path. In case of equilibrium accep-
tance of the side mechanism the beliefs following rejection of the side mechanism are
not restricted in any way.
The optimal mechanisms from Theorems 3 and 4 can be implemented in a uniquely
collusion-proof way. Both of those mechanisms are implementing a cartel interim efﬁ-
cientallocationwithrespecttoalinearsymmetricmenuwithaspeciﬁcallychosenprice
relative to weight functions that assign all the welfare weight to the highest type of each
agent. We take a weakly collusion-proof grand mechanism from the proof of Theorem 2
and extend the set of messages available to each agent with an option to “buy the good
now” at a price that provides the highest type of each agent with the same interim pay-
off (minus " > 0 chosen by the agent) as the desired allocation function. These extra
options ensure the unique collusion-proofness of the grand mechanism.
Theorem 5. Assume p is a cartel interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to the linear
symmetric menu with a price R relative to the weight functions W,...,W where
R =
(
=(1 Fn()) if  +(F()=f ())=(1 Fn())
R if  +(F()=f ())<=(1 Fn())
and R is deﬁned as in Theorem 4. Then there exists a uniquely collusion-proof grand
mechanism   with this menu that implements the allocation function p.
6.4 Related literature
OurmodelbuildsonthemethodologydevelopedbyLaffontandMartimort(1997,2000).
They show that the agents’ asymmetric information may prevent them from colluding
efﬁciently. The principal is then able to exploit the resulting transaction costs of the col-
lusivearrangementtoherbeneﬁt. Intheirmodelthecartelmaximizestheagents’aggre-
gate sum of ex ante payoffs, the participation decisions are made noncooperatively, and
each agent has only two possible types. Under the independence of the private infor-
mation, Laffont and Martimort (1997) show that the principal can prevent collusion at
no cost by allowing the collusion to operate efﬁciently, i.e., the principal ﬁnds it optimal
to implement an interim efﬁcient allocation relative to the cartel’s welfare weights.
Che and Kim (2006) signiﬁcantly generalize the results of Laffont and Martimort
(1997, 2000). In particular they show that when the private information is indepen-
dently distributed the principal can always ﬁght off collusion at no cost using a robustly
collusion-proof grandmechanismthatworksforanycartelwelfareweightfunctionsand
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Their construction exploits the fact that the agents make the participation decisions
noncooperatively. The principal’s grand mechanism has the property that the sum of
the agents’ payments is always equal to the expected Myerson revenue. This implies
that the only allocation the cartel can implement without violating the constraints is the
Myerson allocation. In our setup such a construction does not work because the agents
can collude on their participation decisions, and thus the cartel can always achieve the
null allocation at no cost.18
Dequiedt (2007) (see also Quesada 2005) studies a two-type model in an auction
environment with the possibility of collusion on participation decisions. Moreover the
cartel can commit to punishment strategies in case an agent refuses to join the collusive
agreement. In this model there are also cases when the principal can achieve the Myer-
sonrevenue. Thishappenswhenitisoptimaltoallocatethegoodonlytothehightypes.
Dequiedt (2007) ﬁnds that the principal does not gain from introducing inefﬁciency in
collusion. In contrast we show that the principal in general beneﬁts from implementing
the interim efﬁcient allocations relative to weights that differ from the cartel’s original
welfareweights. Wearenotcertainwhetherthisdifferenceisdueentirelytothefactthat
Dequiedt (2007) considers two-type distributions of the agents’ private information, or
whether the assumption that the cartel can commit to punishment strategies in case an
agent refuses to join the collusive agreement also plays a role.
In Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) the private information is distributed contin-
uously and collusion on participation decisions is allowed. They do not solve for the
optimal mechanism because their primary interest is to study the relative performance
of different organizational arrangements: centralization with collusion, delegation, and
intermediation. In terms of their model we provide a solution to the design of the opti-
mal grand mechanism in the case of centralization with collusion.
In complementary work, Che and Kim (2007) independently obtain many of the re-
sults of this paper. They use a different approach and focus on the scenario in which
the principal cannot prohibit reallocations of the good. Che and Kim (2007) have an
analogue of our Theorem 3, which provides a weakly collusion-proof mechanism that
achieves the Myerson revenue when it is possible to do so, and extend this result to the
case of asymmetric agents. They also have an analogue of our Theorem 4, which pro-
vides the best linear symmetric weakly collusion-proof mechanism when the Myerson
revenue cannot be achieved. For the case of symmetric bidders, Che and Kim (2007)
are also able to handle the case in which only a subset of the agents participate in the
cartel, which is not covered in this paper. It turns out that in this case there always exists
a weakly collusion-proof mechanism that achieves the Myerson revenue.
Che and Kim (2007) manage to obtain their results without providing a complete
characterization of the set of allocations that can be achieved by weakly collusion-proof
mechanisms, as presented in our Theorems 1 and 2. We believe that this characteri-
zation has stand-alone value as demonstrated in Section 6.1, where Theorem 2 is used
to provide examples of weakly collusion-proof mechanisms that outperform the best
linear symmetric mechanisms when reallocations can be prohibited.
18See Section 2 for an example.410 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
7. Conclusion
While our research addresses the problem of optimal mechanism design when the par-
ticipating agents collude both on the way they play the mechanism and on their partici-
pation decisions, the methodology developed can be applied to a much broader class of
environments than the auction environment considered in this paper. It is also possible
to treat cases of heterogeneous agents and to allow partial cartels, as demonstrated by
Che and Kim (2007).
There remain a number of open questions. For example, it is important to study the
robustness of the results to alternative assumptions about the formation and operation
of the cartel. It also would be interesting to study the case in which the principal is
uncertain about the number of agents who may participate in her mechanism, because
thecurrentdesignoftheoptimalmechanismreliesontheassumptionthattheprincipal
has this information.
In Section 6.3 we discuss another set of pressing issues that have to do with the mul-
tiplicityofequilibriaoftheoverallgameandwithexploringthepossibilityofcartelswith
“incomplete participation.” In this paper we suggest a notion of uniquely collusion-
proof mechanisms as a way of addressing these issues. However, our proposed ﬁx may
be of limited interest for practical applications since it utilizes theoretical constructs
from implementation theory that are often perceived as being impracticable.
Another interesting extension is to study the effect of relaxing the budget balance
constraint onthe sidepayments inside thecartel. Thisquestion becomesrelevant when
the cartel activity extends beyond a given auction, and thus the cartel could bring in
extra funds to subsidize collusion.19 In this scenario the collusion-proofness principle
is no longer valid: it is possible that a principal may welcome collusion because of the
possibility of capturing some of the cartel’s extra funds. The effect on the agents’ abil-
ity to collude seems to depend on the speciﬁcs of the formal model and awaits future
research.
Appendix
A. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume (p,t) is feasible and budget balanced in  . Take any  2.
Since p() = E()[e p(m)] and e p(m) 2 1 for every m 2 M, we have p() 2 co(1) = .
By deﬁnition of the function c we must have
n X
i=1







 E()[c(e p(m))]c(E()[e p(m)])=c(p()),
19We thank one of the referees for suggesting this extension.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 411

















Hence p() and t() satisfy (i) and (ii).
Take any  2  and consider a vector of allocations p() and a vector of payments
t() that satisfy (i) and (ii).




i=1e ti(m) j m 2 M
	
, and let D = co(D). Notice that
(p(),c(p())) 2 D by deﬁnition of c and by Condition 2. By Carathéodory’s theorem20
any point in the set D can be represented as a convex combination of at most n + 2




















by sending the messages m1,...,mK with the probabilities 1,...,K. To achieve the



























20See for example Section 17 in Rockafellar (1970).412 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)




E e [(e )] E e  (i+1)[(i+1, e  (i+1))]+E e  i[(i, e  i)] ()

,
for every i and every  2, where by n +1 we mean 1.
Notice that E e  i[t 0








ti()+E e [(e )] ()=c(p())+E e [(e )]c(p()),
where the last equality follows from the fact that (p,t) is ex ante budget balanced. 










































where the last equality follows from Lemma 3 and integration by parts. Thus the sum of



















The inequality in the statement of the lemma holds if and only if (p,t) is ex ante
budget balanced. 
Before proving Theorem 1 we ﬁrst reformulate the cartel’s problem and then state a
version of the separating hyperplane theorem from functional analysis to be used in the
proof. Next we introduce some additional notation and prove one preliminary lemma.
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 the problem of the cartel facing a grand mecha-















E i[pi(e i, i)]d e id!i(i)

,
where p :! andUi 2R for every i, subject to
F0: p()2 for every  2
IC0: E i[pi(i, i)] is non-decreasing in i for every i
IR0: Ui +
R i
 E i[pi(e i, i)]d e i  Vi(i)0 for every i and i 2[,].
Let Y be a linear vector space andZ a normed linear vector space. LetZ be the dual
space for Z, that is the space of all bounded linear functionals on Z. Denote by hz,zi
the value of the linear functional z 2Z at the point z 2Z.
Proposition 2 (adapted from Theorem 1, Chapter 8 in Luenberger 1968). Let 
 be a
convex subset of Y. Assume that the positive cone in Z contains an interior point. Let
' be a real-valued concave functional on 
 and G a concave mapping from 
 intoZ. Let
0 =sup'(y) subject to y 2
,G(y)0,
and assume 0 is ﬁnite. Then there is an element z
0 0 inZ and r0 0 such that (r0,z
0)
is non-null (either z






Deﬁne  to be the space of functions p :  ! Rn that are integrable for each i. Let
Y =Rn. Clearly Y is a linear vector space.
LetZ be the space of n continuous functionsUi : [,] ! R. Adopt a max norm for
Z, i.e., for any (U1,...,Un) 2Z the norm is deﬁned by k(U1,...,Un)k = maxt2[,],i jUi(t)j.
Hence Z is a normed linear vector space. Deﬁne the positive cone in Z as the space of
n non-negative functions. It is routine to verify that the positive cone in Z has a non-
empty interior.21
Deﬁne the set b 
   to consist of the functions p 2  satisfying the constraints F0,
IC0, and BB0 in Program C0, and let 
 = b 
  Rn. Let the mapping G from 
 into Z be
deﬁned by the left-hand side of the inequality constraints IR0. ObviouslyG is a concave
mapping since it is deﬁned by linear functionals on Y. The objective functional ' is
linear on Y and thus concave.
Lemma 7. 
 is convex.
21Section 8.2 in Luenberger (1968).414 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)









We show that (p,U
1,...,U
n) satisﬁes the constraints F0, IC0, and BB0. The con-
straint F0 is satisﬁed since  is convex:
p()=p()+(1 )p0()2 for every .






is non-decreasing in i for every i.













































The ﬁrst two terms are non-positive since (p,U1,...,Un) and (p0,U0
1,...,U0
n) satisfy the
constraint BB0; the last term is non-positive by the convexity of c (see Section 4.1). 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume (p,U1,...,Un) solves the problem of the cartel facing a
grand mechanism   with menu (,c), i.e., solves Program C0. Since all the conditions
of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed, there exists z
0  0 in the dual space of Z and r0  0 such
that either z
0 > 0, or r0 > 0, or both. Moreover, by the Riesz representation theorem22
there exist n bounded non-decreasing right-continuous functions 1,...,n such that























22Theorem 6, Section 36 in Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970).Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 415
Deﬁne functions W1,...,Wn as follows: Wi(i) = r0!i(i)+i(i) for every i and i.






















subject to F0, IC0, and BB0 given in Program C0.
We can drop the last term in the objective function since it is constant. Since (r0,z
0)


































 dW1(1) = 1. If
R 
 dWn(n) < 1 then simultaneously increasing U1
anddecreasingUn wouldallowforanunboundedvaluefortheobjectivefunction. Since
the solution (p,U1,...,Un) must also solve the original problem, the individual ratio-
nality constraints IR0 would be violated for agent n, which is a contradiction. Thus
R 
 dWi(i) = 1 for every i. Without loss of generality we can normalize Wi() = 1 for
every i.










E i[pi(e i, i)]d e i dWi(i),
which proves the result. 
Proof of Corollary 1. According to Theorem 1, (p,U1,...,Un) must be cartel interim
efﬁcient with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn, i.e., must
solve Program CIE. Notice that at the optimum the constraint BB must hold with equal-416 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)







































The constraints F coincide with the constraints F, and the constraints IC coincide
















Hence p is cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the weights
W1,...,Wn, i.e., solves Program CIE. 
B. Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 2. Let p be a cartel interim efﬁcient allocation function with re-
spect to the menu (,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn, i.e., let p solve the Program
CIE.
First we construct a grand mechanism   = hM, e p,e ti with menu (,c) that imple-
ments the allocation function p. Let the set of messages Mi available to agent i consist
of all his possible types [,] and the rejection message ?. If at least one of the agents
sends the rejection message ?, then nobody receives the good and nobody receives any
payment. If none of the agents submits the rejection message then the vector of alloca-





E i[pi(e i, i)]d e i  UN

















The interim payoff of agent i of type i is
UN




E i[pi(e i, i)]d e i +UN
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which is at leastUN
i ()  0 by BB. Hence no type of any agent has an incentive to send























According to Lemma 2 there exists a payment function e t :  ! Rn such that
E i[e ti(i, i)]= E i[t 0




ibility is satisﬁed due to the envelope formula and IC. Hence there exists a truth-telling
equilibrium in   that results in the allocation function p.
Now we show weak collusion-proofness. The solution to the cartel’s problem
(b p, b U1,..., b Un) when facing the grand mechanism   with menu (,c) and outside op-
tionsUN
1 ,...,UN
n has to satisfy the individual rationality constraints
b Ui(i)UN
i (i) for every i and i,












However p is interim efﬁcient with respect to the menu (,c) relative to the weights






























and thus the allocation function b p must also be cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to
the menu (,c) relative to the weights W1,...,Wn, i.e., it must solve Program CIE. By
the essential uniqueness condition we also must have b Ui(i) =UN















n ) solves the cartel’s problem (Program C), which gives the
result. 418 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume  + (F()=f ())  =(1   Fn()). Denote R =
=(1 Fn()). Consider the linear and symmetric menu
 = and c(p)=R
n X
i=1
pi for every p 2.
Consider the symmetric weights
Wi(i)=W(i)=
(
0 if i 2[,)
1 if i =
for every i.
We show that a mechanism that implements an interim efﬁcient allocation with re-
spect to such a menu relative to such weights achieves the Myerson revenue. Consider















F: p(1,...,n)2 for every (1,...,n)2















































where   0. Notice that i +(F(i)=f (i)) (=(1+))(1=f (i)) R is increasing for
every 0 by Condition 1. Hence the solution must have the form
pi(1,...,n)=
(
1 if i >max

maxj6=i j, b 
	
0 otherwise
for every i and (1,...,n),
where b  is such that b  +(F(b )=f (b )) (=(1+))(1=f (b ))=R if such a value of b  exists
and  otherwise. Notice that the constraint IC is automatically satisﬁed.
Assume the constraint BB does not bind. Then  = 0 and b  + (F(b )=f (b )) = R.
Such a value of b  exists since R 2 (,). Recall that  +(F()=f ())  R, which by
Condition 1 implies b  .Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Auction design in the presence of collusion 419






























 R = R <0 for every  2(b ,),
which gives a contradiction. Hence the constraint BB does bind and b  = . The rev-










Now assume the Myerson revenue can be achieved by a mechanism that imple-
ments an interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to some menu (,c) relative to some
weights W1,...,Wn. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem23 implies that to achieve the
















where ei 2Rn and ei
i =1, ei
j =0 for j 6=i.





































which gives the result. 
23See Myerson (1981).420 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Proof of Lemma 5. Let b p be an interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to the linear
and symmetric menu with price R relative to the weight functions W,...,W. The form








where ^  is the cutoff type.
Let p0 be an interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to the linear and symmetric
menu with price R relative to the weight functions W1,...,Wn. Denote 0
i = inffi :
E i[p0
i(i, i)] > 0g and k = argmini 0
i. Denote the principal’s revenue by 0 and as-
sume that 0 > b .
Case 1 The allocation b p is such that the constraint BB does not bind.
By the optimality of the allocation b p we have b  +(F(b )=f (b )) = R, and by the opti-




k))  R. This implies that
b  0
k.
By the deﬁnition of 0


























k))R(1 Fn(b ))= b ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the facts
Pn
i=1p0
i()  1 and Prfmaxi i > 0
kg =
(1   Fn(0
k)), and the second inequality follows from b   0
k. This contradicts our as-
sumption that 0 > b .
Case 2 The allocation b p is such that the constraint BB binds.















F: p(1,...,n)2 for every (1,...,n)2
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Notice that i  ((1 F(i))=f (i)) (1 )R is increasing by Condition 1. Hence the




1 if i >maxfmaxj6=i j,00g
0 otherwise
for every i and (1,...,n),
where 00 is such that 00  ((1 F(00))=f (00))=(1 )R if such a value of 00 exists and





























































where the ﬁrst equality is due to the fact that the constraint BB binds at b p, the second
equalityutilizestheformof b p,theﬁrstinequalityusesthefactthat ((1 F())=f ()) 
R < 0 for every   b , the third equality utilizes the form of p00, and the ﬁnal inequality
holds since p00 solves the auxiliary problem. We have reached a contradiction since p0
violates the constraint BB. 
Before proving Theorem 4 we establish a technical result that helps to ﬁnd the price
that maximizes the revenue of the principal.




































(ii) R()=; and (iii) R0()<1 for every  <.

























This implies that there exists a unique 0 2(,) with the desired properties.
Intheremainderoftheproofweestablish(i),(ii),and(iii). Property(i)holdsbecause




































(1 Fn(e ) nFn 1(e )(1 F(e )))d e .
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A sufﬁcient condition for this expression to be negative is









































Proof of Theorem 4. Let b p be an interim efﬁcient allocation with respect to the linear
and symmetric menu with price R relative to the weight functions W,...,W. The form
of the solution b p is derived in Theorem 3.
First we show that  <  0. If R =  +(F()=f ()) then the cartel’s optimal cutoff




















where the inequality follows from the assumption that  + (F()=f ()) <



















n f ()Fn 1()Ô0 when  Ó.
Thus
R 
 (e   ((1 F(e ))=f (e )))dFn(e ) is decreasing on the interval [0,].
Consider R < 0 +(F(0)=f (0)). Then the cartel’s optimal cutoff is b  such that b  +















where the inequality comes from the fact that  is a maximizer of ( +(F()=f ()))
(1 Fn()) over [,0].424 Gregory Pavlov Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Consider R  0 +(F(0)=f (0)). Then the cartel’s optimal cutoff is b  such that b  +
(F(b )=f (b )) = R, which implies that b   0. By Lemma 8, BB is violated unless b  = 0,















































where the ﬁrst equality follows from the binding constraint BB, the ﬁrst inequality
comes from the fact that
R 
 (e    ((1   F(e ))=f (e )))dFn(e ) is decreasing on the inter-
val [0,], the second equality is by the deﬁnition of 0, and the last inequality comes
from the fact that  is a maximizer of ( +(F()=f ()))(1 Fn()) over [,0]. 
C. Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6. Assume (p,t) is feasible and budget balanced in  . Take any  2.
Since p()= E()[e p(m)+z(m,)] and e p(m)+z(m,)21 for every m 2M and  2,
we have p()2co(r
1)=r. By the deﬁnition of the function cr we must have
n X
i=1

































Hence p() and t() satisfy (i) and (ii).
Take any  2  and consider a vector of allocations p() and a vector of payments
t() that satisfy (i) and (ii).
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Carathéodory’s theorem, any point in the set Dr can be represented as a convex com-
bination of at most three points in the set Dr
1. Thus there exist d 1,...,d K in the set Dr
1












By the deﬁnition of the set Dr








=d k for every k.
Hence the cartel can achieve an allocation
PK
k=1k e p(mk) and a vector of payments
PK
k=1ke t(mk) by sending the messages m1,...,mK with the probabilities 1,...,K.







  e p(mk) for every k.






e pi(mk)1 for every k.
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Proof of Theorem 5. Wegivetheproofforthecase+(F()=f ())=(1 Fn()).
The argument for the other case is similar.
Consider the weakly collusion-proof grand mechanism   from Theorem 2 that im-
plements the cartel interim efﬁcient allocation p. Modify this grand mechanism by ex-
tending the set of messages Mi available to agent i with the following subset of mes-








If none of the agents chooses “buy the good now” then the game proceeds as before. If
oneoftheagentschooses“buythegoodnow”, thenhegetsthegoodforsureattheprice
R0, while the other agents getzero payoffs, and the game is over. If several agents choose
“buy the good now”, then the agent with the lowest price R0 (and the lowest index i in
case several agents chose the same price R0) gets the good for sure at this price, while all
the other agents get zero payoffs, and the game is over.
The interim payoff of agent i of type i from the truth-telling equilibrium in the






























Hence the truth-telling equilibrium in the mechanism   remains an equilibrium.
Next we show that the modiﬁcation of the grand mechanism does not change the
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Now we show unique collusion-proofness. Consider any equilibrium of the game,
which may have either acceptance or rejection of the collusive proposal on the equilib-
rium path. Denote by b p the allocation function and by ( b U1,..., b Un) the interim payoffs
resulting from this equilibrium. If (b p, b U1,..., b Un) 6= (p,UN
1 ,...,UN
n ), then (b p, b U1,..., b Un)
is not cartel interim efﬁcient with respect to the linear symmetric menu with a price R
relative to the weight functions W,...,W. On the other hand, (p,UN
1 ,...,UN
n ) is cartel
interim efﬁcient with respect to the linear symmetric menu with the price R relative to
the weight functions W,...,W, and, moreover, the allocation function p is essentially









Thus there exists an agent i such that b Ui() < UN
i (). However agent i of type  can
alternatively choose to “buy the good now at the price   
R 














For sufﬁciently small " this payoff is greater than b Ui(). Hence there cannot be such an
equilibrium, and thus every equilibrium of the game results in the allocation function p
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